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For most Americans, religion and politics are like oil and water.  They 
do not, and should not, mix.  The tension between the two topics is evident, 
even from a cursory view at the news.  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer has highlighted this 
conflict once again.  Due to the constant public debate regarding the 
relationship between religion and politics, Trinity Lutheran will have a 
substantial impact on the religious freedom landscape for decades to come. 
Locally, this decision impacts Kansas’s constitution.  Article 6, 
Section 6 of the Kansas Constitution describes how education funding will 
occur in Kansas.1  Recently, this topic has been a battleground between 
the Kansas courts and the Kansas Legislature.2  At the end of this section 
is clause (c).  This clause is short, only containing fourteen words, yet it 
sets the stage for potential litigation in Kansas under the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Trinity Lutheran.  Due to its simplicity, 
clause (c) is very clear: “No religious sect or sects shall control any part of 
the public educational funds.”3  This section is one of many sections in 
various state constitutions prohibiting state funding from going to 
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 1.   KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 6(c).  Kansas’s no-funding provision has moved around Article 6.  At 
its creation, the provision was in Article 6, Section 8 but after the 1966 amendments to Article 6 it was 
shuffled to its current position in § 6 in order to “emplace a modern approach to public education.”  
FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE KANSAS STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 98–103 (1992). 
 2.   Craig Martin & John Rury, The Kansas Education Funding Case and Constitutional 
Democracy, HUFFPOST (Jan. 16, 2009, 8:07 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/craig-
martin/kansas-school-funding_b_6481840.html. 
 3.   KAN. CONST. art. 6, § 6(c). 
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religious educational institutions.4  These sections, typically called Blaine 
Amendments or no-funding provisions, have a very controversial past and 
potentially, a controversial future. 
In June 2017, the United States Supreme Court found that the State of 
Missouri violated the Free Exercise Clause and discriminated against 
Trinity Lutheran Church when it prevented them from receiving funding 
for a public grant program.5  This decision opened the door to question the 
constitutionality of Blaine Amendments.  The Court’s rationale in Trinity 
Lutheran and past precedent indicate that these no-funding provisions, 
including Kansas’s Article 6, Section 6(c), are unconstitutional under the 
Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution.  The potential repercussions of 
this rationale could lead to public funding for religious schools. 
This Comment addresses the statutory impact Trinity Lutheran will 
have on Article 6, Section 6(c) of the Kansas Constitution.  Considering 
the Court’s Trinity Lutheran holding in conjunction with prior precedents 
Zelman v. Selman-Harris6 and Locke v. Davey,7 Kansas’s no-funding 
provision (and other similar state statutes) is likely unconstitutional as 
applied to indirect educational funding.  Further, at least in some 
applications, Zelman and Trinity Lutheran provide a test for future 
religious freedom cases involving indirect governmental funding. 
Part II examines the background of Blaine Amendments generally, 
Kansas’s Blaine Amendment, and analysis of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Zelman v. Selman-Harris, Locke v. Davey and Trinity 
Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer.  Part III analyzes Trinity 
Lutheran’s impact on Kansas’s state constitutional provisions that bar 
various types of state funding for religious institutions, its impact on the 
federal doctrine of separation of church and state, and policy implications 
for the school-choice movement. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Blaine Amendments 
Throughout American history, Blaine Amendments occupy a 
                                                        
 4.   Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: 
Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551, 576–602 (2003). 
 5.   Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024–25 (2017). 
 6.   Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002) (holding a state sponsored school 
voucher program did not violate the Establishment Clause). 
 7.   Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (holding Washington’s Blaine Amendment did 
not unconstitutionally prevent Locke from studying theology). 
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relatively unknown place.  While opposition to these Amendments has 
existed since their inception, it is only recently that courts have started 
pushing back against these no-funding provisions.8  Blaine Amendments 
are state constitutional provisions that bar various types of state funding 
for religious institutions.9  They can be relatively simple, like the Kansas 
provision, which only bars public funding of religious schools, or they can 
be comprehensive and cover all manners of public funding for religious 
institutions.10  These provisions have been a part of the American legal 
landscape since the Nineteenth Century, and they owe their purpose to 
their namesake, James Blaine.11 
1. History of the Federal Blaine Amendment 
Religious rights are some of the most cherished rights recognized by 
the Bill of Rights.12  The First Amendment recognizes two religious rights, 
the freedom from “law respecting an establishment of religion,” and 
freedom from laws “prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”13  In simpler 
terms, these clauses prevent the state from establishing a state church, like 
the Church of England or Church of Denmark, and prevent the 
establishment of laws that unduly interfere with the practice of religion.14  
Very few cases involving these rights went to the Supreme Court before 
the 1940s.15  After the 1940s, more states began incorporating these rights 
                                                        
 8.  See e.g., Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. 2012; Schwartz v. Lopez, 382 P.3d 886, 900 (Nev. 
2016) (holding while a state educational savings account program violated the Nevada constitution, 
the program did not violate Nevada’s Blaine Amendment). 
 9.   Jill Goldenziel, Blaine’s Name in Vain?: State Constitutions, School Choice, and Charitable 
Choice, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 57, 58 (2005). 
 10.   See id. at 68–95 (comparing the various types of Blaine Amendments).  
 11.   DeForrest, supra note 4, at 556–57.  
 12.   John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American 
Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 377–88 (1996) (exploring the importance 
of religious rights to various factions in colonial America).  
 13.   U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 14.   Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (“The ‘establishment of religion’ clause 
of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a 
church.  Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over 
another . . . No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or 
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion 
. . . In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 
‘a wall of separation between Church and State.’” (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 
164 (1878)); see also Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) 
(“[T]he protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some 
or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious 
reasons.”). 
 15.   Mark David Hall, Jeffersonian Walls and Madisonian Lines: The Supreme Court’s Use of 
History in Religious Clauses Cases, 85 OR. L. REV. 563, 570 (2006). 
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and cases involving religious rights became more common.16  This 
application, however, fails to recognize that issues revolving around these 
rights existed before their application to individual states.  In particular, 
the Blaine Amendment and its offspring have spawned various religious 
rights debates and will continue to spawn these debates until the United 
States Supreme Court sets a clear path forward. 
Blaine Amendments have long been a point of controversy in the First 
Amendment sphere.  They have had a large influence on litigation 
surrounding funding of religious institutions because state courts’ rely 
upon them to deny state funding to religious entities/purposes, even where 
federal precedent would allow it.17  The Blaine Amendment originated in 
1875 when House Speaker James Blaine argued for an amendment to the 
United States Constitution which would prohibit the public funding of 
religious schools.18  Spurred on by a speech made by President Grant, 
Blaine, a representative from Maine, laid out his proposal.19  The proposal 
stated: 
No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religious or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in 
any State for the support of the public schools, or derived from any public 
fund therefore, nor any public lands devoted thereto, shall ever be under 
the control of any religious sect, nor shall any money so raised or lands 
so devoted be divided between religious sects or denominations.20 
Blaine’s proposal conflicted members of the Democratic Party.21  They did 
not want to alienate Catholics, who represented a large part of their 
constituency, but drawing close to Catholicism would leave them 
vulnerable to Republican attacks.22  To make the amendment more 
palatable, House Democrats inserted a limiting clause which reduced the 
                                                        
 16.   Id.; see e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940); see also Locke v. 
Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718–19 (2004). 
 17.   Mechthild Fritz, Religion in a Federal System: Diversity Versus Uniformity, 38 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 39, 70 (1989) (“States tend to rely upon more specific state constitutional provisions that prohibit 
public subsidies to religious institutions or for religious purposes, or that prohibit financial compulsion 
to support religion.”). 
 18.   DeForrest, supra note 4, at 556. 
 19.   Id. at 558. 
 20.   H.R.J. Res. 1, 44th Cong. (1875). 
 21.   DeForrest, supra note 4, at 566 (“As the Blaine Amendment was debated, Democratic 
politicians were caught between a rock and a hard place.  They had no desire to alienate Catholic 
voters—a key voting block for the Democratic Party—but they had no desire to appear to be too 
closely connected with the Catholic Church either.”). 
 22.   Id. 
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amendment to a “statement of principles.”23  The House greeted this 
proposal with fervor, and it passed 180 to 7.24 
However, the Senate gave the proposal a lukewarm greeting where it 
failed to gather the necessary votes.25  Senate Republicans disfavored the 
weakened amendment and sought to expand it.26  The final Senate vote on 
the amended House version was 28 in favor, 16 against and 27 absent—
short of the necessary two-thirds majority required.27  The controversial 
nature of this debate is exemplified by the fact that newly minted Senator 
Blaine, the original author of the amendment, voted to abstain in the final 
vote.28  Though Blaine’s plan failed, his idea endured.  State legislatures 
took up Blaine’s cause as they added amendments modeled on the Federal 
Blaine Amendment to their state constitutions.29  Today, roughly thirty 
states have some type of Blaine Amendment or no-funding provision.30 
2. Motivations Behind the Blaine Amendments 
Most historians are convinced that motivation fueling the Blaine 
Amendments was colored by anti-Catholic views.31  Public schools were 
viewed as a bastion of Protestantism and served, “as a defense of 
democratic values, rather than the values of a particular religious 
tradition.”32  As a response to the Protestant nature of the public schools, 
Catholic schools were established.33  In Blaine’s era, this connection 
between Protestantism and the public schools was under siege.  There was 
a movement to remove the King James Bible from the educational system 
                                                        
 23.   Id. at 567–68. 
 24.   Id. at 568. 
 25.   Id. at 573. 
 26.   Id. at 568–73. 
 27.   Id. at 573. 
 28.   Id.  
 29.   Id. at 573–75. 
 30.   Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117, 134 
(2000). 
 31.   See e.g., DeForrest, supra note 4, at 559–73; Stephen K. Green, The Blaine Amendment 
Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 69 (1992) (“The Blaine Amendment was the direct result of 
Republican attempts to gain political mileage from a growing concern over Catholic and immigrant 
inroads into American culture.”); but see Jill Goldenziel, supra note 9, at 62 (“Only scant historical 
records and incomplete constitutional convention journals document the enactment of these 
amendments in the states, and the few available accounts reveal little evidence of bigotry.  Whatever 
anti-Catholic animus might have lain behind the no-funding provisions at their inception has not yet 
been shown to influence current state jurisprudence.”).  
 32.   DeForrest, supra note 4, at 560. 
 33.   Id. at 571 (“Catholics were not opposed to paying taxes for schools, nor were they opposed 
to the principle of free education; rather, Catholics were opposed to paying taxes and sending their 
children to schools that would indoctrinate their children in Protestant sectarianism.”). 
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and Catholic leaders in America pushed for government funding of a 
separate Catholic education system.34  As Catholic immigration to 
America continued to grow, Catholic political power grew alongside it.35 
This influx of Catholic immigrants and power spawned anti-Catholic 
sentiment in much of the American public.  Both Republicans and 
Democrats dipped into the anti-Catholic fervor to gain political strength, 
yet the Republicans went the farthest with it.36  The anti-Catholic purpose 
behind the proposed federal Blaine Amendment was more apparent in the 
debates that occurred during this time.  Senator Edmunds, a Republican 
Senator from Vermont, attacked the Catholic Church on the floor of the 
Senate, arguing that while the proposed amendment would only stop 
Catholicism from being supported, generic Protestantism would generally 
still be accepted in the public sphere.37  Although the federal Blaine 
Amendment ultimately failed to pass, the underlying anti-Catholic 
purpose of the amendment trickled into many state constitutions.38  In 
summation, there were two main motivations behind the Blaine 
Amendments.  First, a fear of the growing political power of Catholics, 
and second, the protection of the “generic Protestant religiosity in the 
common schools and the public square.”39 
3. State Blaine Amendments 
State Blaine Amendments come in all shapes and sizes.  While quite 
common—roughly thirty state constitutions contain them—their varied 
interpretations can make it difficult to place them in a singular box.40  The 
states that adopted these amendments tended to do so either willingly or 
                                                        
 34.   Id. at 560 (“This effort was, at its core, a quest for equity.  Catholics were forced to pay taxes 
to support the Protestant common schools, and it was only fair, from the Catholic perspective, that 
Catholic schools also be eligible for public funding.  In lieu of direct public funding for parochial 
schools, an appeal was made for Catholic parents to receive tax rebates equal to the amount of their 
tax bills that went to fund the Protestant common schools.”). 
 35.   Id. at 560–62. 
 36.   Id. at 564. 
 37.   Id. at 570–71 (“Edmunds sought to distinguish religion—the general principles of morality 
and faith that could be attributed to the kind of generic Protestantism that had formed the common 
schools from the beginning—from sectarianism, i.e., Catholicism.  In short, desacralized 
Protestantism, would remain welcome in the common schools and other public institutions.”). 
 38.   Id. at 573. 
 39.   Id. at 602. 
 40.   Id. at 576 (surveying the various state Blaine Amendments). 
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in order to gain statehood.41  When analyzing these laws, it’s helpful to 
break them down relative to their strength.42 
The weakest Blaine Amendments focus solely on education.43  This 
class of amendments were designed to prevent any direct public support 
for religious education, but have minimal to no effect outside of 
education.44  Nevertheless, due to their weak language, indirect support of 
religious education is possible.45 
Blaine Amendments of moderate strength tend to prevent direct 
support of religious schools but the courts are left to interpret whether 
indirect support is allowed.46  This has created an uneven application of 
these laws because states with similar no-funding provision language have 
reached radically different conclusions regarding where the aid crosses 
over into unconstitutional territory.47  Nebraska is an example of a state 
with a moderate Blaine Amendment, which states “appropriation of public 
funds shall not be made to any school or institution of learning not owned 
or exclusively controlled by the state” and “[t]he state shall not accept 
money or property to be used for sectarian purposes.”48 
Finally, the strongest Blaine Amendments block both direct and 
indirect aid for religious schools and tend to use broad language in order 
to encompass all religious institutions.49  Missouri’s Blaine Amendment is 
an example of a strong Blaine Amendment.50  Its language bars any level 
of government from “fund[ing] . . . anything in aid of any religious creed, 
                                                        
 41.   Heytens, supra note 30, at 134 (“During the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
approximately thirty states wrote or amended their constitutions to include language substantially 
similar to that of the defeated federal Blaine Amendment.  In fact, Congress required that several 
prospective states include such provisions in their constitutions as a condition for admission to the 
Union.”). 
 42.   DeForrest, supra note 4, at 577 (“One way to approach this material is to think about the 
state Blaine Amendments and their supporting case law on a continuum.  On one end of the continuum 
are those states whose constitutional provisions and court rulings are narrowly cast to limit the 
restrictive scope of the Blaine Amendment.  On the other end of the continuum are those states whose 
basic charters and judicial decisions cast a broad net over state government decisions to provide direct 
and indirect aid to religiously-affiliated schools.  In the middle is a hodgepodge of states with Blaine 
provisions that permit some form of government aid to religious schools but prohibit overt funding.”). 
 43.   Id. at 577–578. 
 44.   Id.  
 45.   See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 565 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002) (holding a state 
sponsored school voucher program did not violate the Establishment Clause). 
 46.   DeForrest, supra note 4, at 578. 
 47.   Id. at 581 (“While it is clear that direct aid to overt sectarian education is prohibited by 
moderate Blaine Amendment language, there is some uncertainty among the states as to the boundary 
of that prohibition.”). 
 48.   NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 11. 
 49.   DeForrest, supra note 4, at 587–88. 
 50.   Id.; MO. CONST. art. IX, § 8. 
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church or sectarian purpose or . . . support[ing] or sustain[ing] any private 
or public school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other 
institution of learning controlled by any religious creed, church or 
sectarian denomination.”51  Florida is another example of a state with a 
strong state Blaine Amendment.52  The Florida provision states, “[n]o 
revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall 
ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any 
church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian 
institution.”53 
4. Kansas’s Blaine Amendment 
When states adopted no-funding provisions for their state 
constitutions, Kansas joined in by adding a Blaine-influenced provision 
into the Kansas Constitution.54  As previously mentioned, some state 
Blaine Amendments are less restrictive because they only apply to the 
funding of public education.55  Kansas’s Blaine Amendment falls into this 
category, however, Kansas’s provision also occupies the middle of the 
spectrum of no-funding provision strength due to the provision’s lack of 
clarity regarding whether indirect funding of religious schools is 
permissible.56  When formed, Kansas went through three other 
constitutions before settling on the Wyandotte Constitution, which was 
approved by Congress.57  Before the finalized constitution, the other 
various proposals were created by abolitionists and pro-slavery settlers in 
Kansas.58 
Out of the four proposed constitutions, the Leavenworth and Topeka 
versions contained the language of the modern Kansas Constitution 
regarding public financing of religious schools.59  Article VII, section 5 of 
                                                        
 51.   MO. CONST. art. IX, § 8.  
 52.   FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; id. art. IX, § 6. 
 53.   FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 54.   KAN. CONST. art. VI, § 8(c) (1859); Heytens, supra note 30, at 134 (“During the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, approximately thirty states wrote or amended their 
constitutions to include language substantially similar to that of the defeated federal Blaine 
Amendment.”). 
 55.   Fritz, supra note 17, at 47–48. 
 56.   DeForrest, supra note 4, at 578. 
 57.   Kan. Historical Soc’y, Kansas Constitutions, KANSAPEDIA (Aug. 2015), 
http://www.kshs.org/kansapedia/kansas-constitutions/16532. 
 58.   HELLER, supra note 1, at 1–3. 
 59.   TOPEKA CONST. of 1855, art. VII, § 2, http://www.kansasmemory.org/item/221061/text 
(“[N]o religious or other sect or sects shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of 
the school funds of this State.”); LEAVENWORTH CONST. of 1858, art. VII, § 5, 
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the Leavenworth Constitution reads, “No religious sect or sects shall ever 
have any right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this State.”60  
This language is identical to the modern constitution, the Wyandotte 
Constitution, which states, “No religious sect or sects shall ever control 
any part of the common-school or University funds of the State.”61  The 
Leavenworth Constitution particularly angered Catholic settlers in 
Kansas.62  This anger caused demonstrations in Leavenworth, displaying 
the growing tensions during the creation of Kansas’s Constitutions.63 
Interestingly, the creators of the Wyandotte Constitution used the 
Ohio Constitution as the basis for the Kansas Constitution.  The Ohio 
Constitution Article 6, Section 2 reads: 
The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or 
otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will 
secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout 
the state; but no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any 
exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this 
state.64 
While sharing similar substance with Kansas’s Blaine Amendment, 
Kansas’s is much shorter; almost as if added as an afterthought.65  Though 
Kansas’s language is different from Ohio’s, Kansas may have 
inadvertently adopted the no-funding provision from Ohio’s Constitution 
                                                        
http://www.kansasmemory.org/item/207410/text (“No religious sect or sects shall ever have any right 
to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this State.”). 
 60.   LEAVENWORTH CONST. of 1858, art. VII, § 5. 
 61.   WYANDOTTE CONST. of 1859, art. VI, § 8, http://www.kansasmemory.org/item/90272/text. 
 62.   Opponents of the Constitution, WHITE CLOUD KAN. CHIEF, May 13, 1858, at 2, 
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82015486/1858-05-13/ed-1/ (“Leavenworth seems to be a 
great hotbed of opposition to the new Constitution, and [word unclear] demonstrations against it are 
held almost every night. We have heard that this opposition principally arises from the Catholics, not 
on account of negro suffrage, as they make believe, but on account of the following Section in the 
Article on Education: SECTION 5. No religious sect or sects shall ever have any right to, or control of, 
any part of the school funds of this State. This is no doubt the secret of the opposition of these blood-
thirsty beings.—They want a part of the public school fund, for which the whole people are taxed, 
given to them, to support their sectarian schools, which are equivalent to nurseries of bigotry and 
houses of prostitution. This opposition alone should be an inducement for all good people to support 
the Constitution.”).  
 63.   Id. 
 64.   OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 65.   Though the reaction to the same provision in the previous constitution may indicate that it 
was more than an “afterthought.” 
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when borrowing the Ohio Constitution’s language.66  Alternately, Kansas 
may have based their no-funding provision on Indiana’s Constitution.67 
During the 1880s, similar Blaine Amendments cropped up in 
numerous states located in the American West because Congress required 
states to have some form of no-funding provision in order to gain 
admission into the Union.68  States met this requirement by adopting 
various versions of the Blaine Amendment.69  However, as noted in the 
debate over the federal Blaine Amendment, these states still reserved space 
for generic Protestantism in the public sphere.70 
The most applicable case interpreting Kansas’s no-funding provision 
is Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. City of Atchison.  This 1892 Kansas 
Supreme Court case involved a taxpayer challenging the city of Atchison’s 
tax increase to support religious schools.71  The court held that the city 
“had no power to impose a tax . . . to aid private sectarian schools.”72  A 
key fact for the court was that the schools would not be under public 
control it did not make sense for the public to fund the private school.73  
Though not directly citing the Kansas no-funding provision, the case 
demonstrates the no-funding provision’s clear restriction on direct aid for 
religious schools.  Almost fifty years later in Wright v. School Dist. No. 27 
of Woodson County, the Kansas Supreme Court reiterated this 
interpretation of the no-funding provision: “[the provision] is clear that no 
                                                        
 66.   Goldenziel, supra note 9, at 67 (“States also may have unwittingly adopted no-funding 
provisions when copying provisions from other states’ constitutions.”). 
 67.   HELLER, supra note 1, at 52; see IND. CONST. art. I, § 6 (“No money shall be drawn from 
the treasury, for the benefit of any religious or theological institution.”). 
 68.   DeForrest, supra note 4, at 573 (“Most of the states that adopted Blaine language did so 
without pressure from the federal government. In other situations, however, Congress did compel the 
inclusion of Blaine Amendment language in some state constitutions, particularly for territories 
seeking admission to the Union as new states.”); Goldenziel, supra note 9, at 66–67 (“Congress 
mandated similar [no-funding] provisions in the legislation enabling the statehood of North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Montana, Washington, Arizona, New Mexico, Utah, Idaho, and Oklahoma, and were 
later ratified as part of the constitutions of those states.”). 
 69.   DeForrest, supra note 4, at 573–74. 
 70.   Id. at 575 (“Like Blaine and those who supported the Blaine Amendment, they believed in 
a robust religious presence in the public square, so long as that religious presence was compatible with 
broad Protestant devotional sentiment.  This can be seen in the preamble to the [Washington] state 
constitution.”).  
 71.   Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. City of Atchison, 28 P. 1000, 1000 (Kan. 1892). 
 72.   Id. at 1001. 
 73.   Id. (“While it is argued that the public is benefited by the increase of schools and the spread 
of learning and knowledge, it is not contended that the colleges in question are under the supervision 
and control of the public, or that there is or could be any legislative authority to expend the public 
revenues for their support.  The officers of the city had no power to impose a tax on the property of 
the citizens of Atchison to aid private, sectarian schools, or to promote private interests and 
enterprises.”). 
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religious sect . . . can lawfully control our school funds.”74  At issue was 
whether a school board could raise tax funds to support a sectarian 
school.75  The petitioner tried to enjoin the school board and claimed that 
as a taxpayer he had standing to challenge the action.76  The Kansas 
Supreme Court held that the petitioner properly had standing to seek an 
injunction.77 
As demonstrated above, Kansas has little case law regarding its no-
funding provision.  Outside of the plain reading of the provision, the only 
other source reflecting potential interpretations of the provision are 
Attorney General advisory opinions given to legislators contemplating 
forms of indirect student aid in Kansas.  There are three opinions from 
1994, 2000, and 2004, all written by Republican Attorney Generals, that 
shed some light on how Kansas governmental officials might interpret the 
provision.78  The 1994 advisory opinion stated that the no-funding 
provision strictly prohibited any form of tax that would pay for or aid 
education in sectarian schools.79  This opinion discussed Kansas’s limited 
case law on the issue before establishing, that because religious schools 
intertwine religious instruction and secular education, any support for the 
secular education side would inadvertently support the religious 
instruction.80  Thus, the 1994 advisory opinion advises that this type of 
indirect student aid would violate Kansas’s no-funding provision.81 
The next advisory opinion, issued in 2000, agreed with the 1994 
opinion’s conclusion but expanded on the private choice component of 
school vouchers.82  The opinion stated that even though the public funding 
was flowing to the schools indirectly by way of the parents’ choices, this 
still had the effect of public money going to religious schools.83  Thus, this 
indirect support of religious schools was a clear violation of Kansas’s no-
funding provision.84 
                                                        
 74.   Wright v. School Dist. No. 27 of Woodson Cty., 99 P.2d 737, 738 (Kan. 1940). 
 75.   Id. 
 76.   Id. 
 77.   Id. 
 78.   Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 94-37 (1994), http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/1994/1994-
037.htm; Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2000-32 (2000), http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/2000/2000-
032.htm; Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2004-5 (2004), http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/2004/2004-
005.htm. 
 79.   Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 94-37 (citing Atchison T. & S.F.R. Co., 28 P. 1000, Billard v. Bd. 
of Educ., 76 P. 422 (1904), and Wright, 99 P.2d 737). 
 80.   Id. 
 81.   Id. 
 82.   Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2000-32. 
 83.   Id. 
 84.   Id. 
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Finally, the most recent advisory opinion, issued in 2004, came to a 
very different conclusion than the others.  The Kansas Attorney General 
determined that Kansas’s no-funding provision did not prevent 
governmental aid to religious schools as long as the aid was for the 
students.85  The Attorney General noted that the legislative history of the 
1966 Constitutional amendment states that the no-funding provision 
would not “prohibit the appropriation of public funds to indirectly benefit 
private institutions.”86  Thus, funding to private schools is permissible as 
long as the funding benefitted the child and not the school.87  In further 
analyzing the effect on a voucher program, the Attorney General noted 
that other states with similar no-funding provisions have struck down 
voucher programs.88  However, Kansas’s voucher program is modeled 
after Ohio’s program, which survived scrutiny in the Zelman cases, and 
thus Kansas’s voucher program likely complies with Kansas’s no-funding 
provision.89 
As these advisory opinions exemplify, there is no clear understanding 
of Kansas’s no-funding provision or how it would be applied in cases of 
indirect funding.  This same confusion is evident in other states as well.90  
It would greatly benefit both Kansas and other states for the Supreme 
Court to explain when these no-funding provisions cross the line into 
violating Free Exercise Rights.  Though Trinity Lutheran gives us a partial 
answer, it is time for the courts to flesh out a full answer. 
B. Zelman, Locke, & Trinity Lutheran: Foundational Cases 
The Supreme Court has dealt with numerous religious freedom cases, 
however, three cases addressing state no-funding provisions stand out.  
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, Locke v. Davey, and Trinity Lutheran v. 
Comer have all profoundly impacted this topic, and together they 
formulate clear guidance on how the courts should resolve conflicts 
between no-funding provisions and religious freedom. 
                                                        
 85.   Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2004-5 (2004), http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/2004/2004-
005.htm. 
 86.   Id. (quoting KAN. LEGIS. COUNCIL, THE EDUCATION AMENDMENT TO THE KANSAS 
CONSTITUTION, Pub. No. 256, at 36 (Dec. 1965)). 
 87.   Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2004-5. 
 88.   Id.  
 89.   Id. 
 90.   See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2015 (2017) 
(addressing Missouri’s no-funding provision); Colo. Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. 
Dist., 351 P.3d 461, 469–76 (Colo. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017); Weinbaum v. Skandera, 
367 P.3d 838, 846 (N.M. 2015), vacated sub. nom., N.M. Ass’n of Non-Pub. Schs. v. Moses, 137 S. 
Ct. 2325 (2017). 
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1. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 
Before Trinity Lutheran, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris was the 
prominent religious freedom case involving public funding of religious 
schools.  In this case, Ohio established a program that gave vouchers to 
students in poorly performing public schools in the Cleveland public 
school district.91  These students could then use the vouchers at any school, 
public or private, that participated in the state program.92  Plaintiffs 
originally challenged this program on a variety of grounds, but two were 
key: first, that the program violated a variety of Ohio Constitutional 
provisions, including Ohio’s no-funding provision, and second, that the 
program violated the Establishment Clause of the United States 
Constitution.93  The issue regarding the violation of the Ohio Constitution 
was sorted before the state supreme court where the Ohio Supreme Court 
held that the provision did not violate their no-funding provision.94  Ohio 
previously established that indirect aid did not give religious schools “an 
exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this state.”95  
However, the Ohio Supreme Court found some procedural defects in the 
Ohio statute.96  The Ohio Legislature subsequently fixed this defect and 
the statute was then challenged a second time, this time in federal court 
which led to Zelman v. Simmons-Harris. 
This left only the Establishment Clause question for the United States 
Supreme Court to answer.  The Court held that the program did not violate 
the Establishment Clause because it did not have the effect of advancing 
religion.97  In coming to this conclusion, the Court relied on the distinction 
between direct and indirect aid.98  The Court noted that its decisions have 
consistently drawn a “distinction between government programs that 
provide aid directly to religious schools, and programs of true private 
choice.”99  Since Ohio’s statute relied on individual choice for the state 
                                                        
 91.   Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644–45 (2002). 
 92.   Id. at 645. 
 93.   Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 207 (Ohio 1999). 
 94.   Id. at 212. 
 95.   Id. (quoting Protestants & Other Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Essex, 
275 N.E.2d 603, 608 (Ohio 1971)). 
 96.   Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203, 214–16 (Ohio 1999) (holding that the creation of 
a substantive program in a general appropriations bill violated Ohio’s constitutional one-subject rule). 
 97.   Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002). 
 98.   Id. at 649–53 (“Three times we have confronted Establishment Clause challenges to neutral 
government programs that provide aid directly to a broad class of individuals, who, in turn, direct the 
aid to religious schools or institutions of their own choosing. Three times we have rejected such 
challenges”). 
 99.   Id. at 649 (citations omitted). 
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money to go to religious organizations the Court would have to focus on 
“whether beneficiaries of indirect aid ha[d] a genuine choice among 
religious and nonreligious organizations.”100  Because the Ohio program 
gave monetary aid to students who then had the choice to give that money 
to religious private schools, Ohio’s program did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.101 
In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor separated this case from 
past cases that found indirect aid unconstitutional by noting that in this 
case, the money reached these religious schools through pure private 
choice.102  She also noted, religious institutions are already awarded 
money from the government through tax breaks and tax credits.103  Due to 
this, the support Cleveland offered religious schools through their voucher 
program, was not “atypical of existing government programs.”104  Thus, 
the Court ruled that the voucher program did not run afoul of the 
Establishment Clause.105  Justice O’Connor’s concurrence further 
explained how the Lemon test should apply to indirect funding cases, 
specifically, whether the program is neutral and if the indirect funding was 
only due to private choice.106 
The dissenting justices seemed very wary about the effect of Zelman 
on existing precedent.107  Justice Souter’s dissent interpreted the Ohio law 
as unconstitutional under an Establishment Clause analysis.108  Justice 
Souter pointed to prior Supreme Court precedent which seemed to indicate 
that any tax supporting religious institutions that teach religion was 
unconstitutional.109  Justice Breyer authored a separate dissent stating his 
concern that the government’s involvement in religious education would 
cause potential social conflict.110  He based this characterization largely 
                                                        
 100.   Id. at 669. 
 101.   Id. at 662–63.  
 102.   Id. at 663 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 103.   Id. at 665 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 104.   Id. at 668 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 105.   Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 106.   Id. at 668–69 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“As originally formulated, a statute passed [the 
Lemon] test only if it had ‘a secular legislative purpose,’ if its ‘principal or primary effect’ was one 
that ‘neither advance[d] nor inhibit[ed] religion,’ and if it did ‘not foster an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.’” (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)). 
 107.   See id. at 688 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 108.   Id. at 686–87 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 109.   Id. at 687 (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 
U.S. 1 (1947), which held that “[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any 
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to 
teach or practice religion.” Id. at 16.). 
 110.   Id. at 717 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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upon the same history and motivation behind the Blaine Amendment’s 
creation.111  In Justice Breyer’s opinion, applying the Establishment 
Clause to the states remedied this social conflict.112  Justice Breyer tied 
this together by stating that the allowance of publicly funded school 
voucher programs would lead back to religious conflict.113 
2. Locke v. Davey 
While providing a clear holding, Zelman failed to clarify the Supreme 
Court’s intention regarding these no-funding provisions as evidenced by 
another case involving a state no-funding provision, Locke v. Davey.114  
This case involved Washington’s Promise Scholarship Program which 
helped gifted high school students pay for college.115  There were some 
caveats to this support, however.  Washington’s strict no-funding 
provision prohibited the state from paying for any scholarships for 
students to study theology.116  Davey challenged this provision as 
unconstitutional when he was denied from using his scholarship to study 
theology.117  The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
state while the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Washington had 
unfairly discriminated against religion and had no compelling reason to 
deny the funding of scholarships for religious training under their 
program.118  The Ninth Circuit viewed the Washington law as treating 
religious students different from non-religious students when it denied 
funding for Davey’s religious education.119 
In Locke, the Supreme Court held that Washington could fund 
scholarships for students who desired to pursue a degree in theology under 
the United States Constitution.120  However, Washington courts had 
interpreted Washington’s constitution as prohibiting indirect funding of 
religious purposes. 121  This ability for some actions to be “permitted by 
                                                        
 111.   Id. at 720–21 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 31–39. 
 112.   Id. at 721–22 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 113.   Id. at 727 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s analysis here appears to permit a 
considerable shift of taxpayer dollars from public secular schools to private religious schools. That 
fact, combined with the use to which these dollars will be put, exacerbates the conflict problem.”). 
 114.   Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004).  
 115.   Id. at 715. 
 116.   Id. at 716. 
 117.   Id. at 717–18. 
 118.   Id. at 718. 
 119.   Id. 
 120.   Id. 
 121.   Id. at 719. 
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the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause” is 
called finding “room for play in the joints.”122  The Court did not find any 
animosity in Washington’s law and did not find it unconstitutional.123  
Further, the majority noted that the students could use the scholarships at 
religious schools and even use the money to take religious classes at either 
a public or religious school.124  The only thing students could not use the 
money for was to pursue a degree in theology.125  At the end of the majority 
opinion, the Court acknowledged the inherent difficulty of handling these 
types of topics.126 
In his dissent, Justice Scalia pointed to the fact that the state had made 
a benefit available to the public.127  Yet Washington withheld the benefit 
on the basis of religion.128 
When the State makes a public benefit generally available, that benefit 
becomes part of the baseline against which burdens on religion are 
measured; and when the State withholds that benefit from some 
individuals solely on the basis of religion, it violates the Free Exercise 
Clause no less than if it had imposed a special tax.129 
This argument proved helpful as it later helped bolster the Court’s decision 
in Trinity Lutheran.130 
Kansas provides another example of the ambiguity of Blaine 
Amendments.  Though Kansas has one of the “weaker” state Blaine 
Amendments, the state government has articulated different opinions 
regarding its impact on topics such as school choice.131  The state 
government’s opinion on the no-funding provision’s impact relies on the 
                                                        
 122.   Id. at 718–19. 
 123.   Id. at 725. 
 124.   Id. at 724 (“The program permits students to attend pervasively religious schools, so long 
as they are accredited.”). 
 125.   Id. at 715. 
 126.   Id. at 725. 
 127.   Id. at 726–27 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 128.   Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 129.   Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 130.   See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2021 (2012) 
(“The Department’s policy expressly discriminates against otherwise eligible recipients by 
disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character.”). 
 131.   Compare Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 94-37 (1994), http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/ 
1994/1994-037.htm (advising that Kansas’s no-funding provision prevents religious schools from 
receiving indirect aid from the 1994 proposed Kansas voucher program), and Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 
2000-32 (2000), http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/2000/2000-032.htm (advising that Kansas’s 
no-funding provision prevents indirect funding of religious schools such as voucher programs), with 
Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2004-5 (2004), http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/2004/2004-005.htm 
(advising that indirect funding of religious schools would not violate Kansas’s no-funding provision). 
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administration.132  Thus, the Kansas Attorney General can give radically 
different answers to the same question.133  Under one administration, the 
no-funding provision in Kansas’s constitution clearly could show that the 
state cannot give school vouchers for religious schools, while future 
administrations could argue that the same provision provides no obstacle 
to such funding.  This resulting whiplash demonstrates the dire need for 
the United States Supreme Court to address and clarify this topic.  Trinity 
Lutheran v. Comer was the latest case to offer the Court this opportunity. 
3. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer 
The Trinity Lutheran cases arose from a simple Missouri 
governmental program, the Scrap Tire Program.134  This program recycles 
old tires into playground surfaces, usually resulting in a safer environment 
for kids playing on the equipment.135  Trinity Lutheran Church applied for 
the program in 2012 for their Child Learning Center, a preschool and 
daycare center.136  When Missouri was analyzing the potential candidates 
for the Scrap Tire Program, Trinity Lutheran was one of the top 
candidates, coming in fifth out of the forty-four applications.137  However, 
Missouri denied the application due to a conflict with Article I, Section 7 
of the Missouri Constitution, which clearly states, “[t]hat no money shall 
ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any 
church.”138  Since the program would serve as public funding of a religious 
institution, the State of Missouri believed their hands were tied in the 
denial of the application.139  Subsequently, Trinity Lutheran brought a 
lawsuit in Federal District Court which the court dismissed, finding that 
the Free Exercise Clause “does not prohibit withholding an affirmative 
benefit on account of religion.”140  The Eighth Circuit affirmed this 
dismissal.141  Both the District Court and the Eighth Circuit Court held that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Locke was persuasive regarding this 
issue.142 
                                                        
 132.   Id. 
 133.   Id. 
 134.   Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2017. 
 135.   Id. 
 136.   Id. 
 137.   Id. at 2018. 
 138.   Id. at 2017–18 (quoting MO. CONST. art. I, § 7). 
 139.   Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2018. 
 140.   Id. 
 141.   Id. 
 142.   Id. at 2018–19. 
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Leading up to the oral argument in the Supreme Court, speculation 
that Trinity Lutheran v. Comer could end up a landmark case for religious 
freedom abounded.143  The speculation turned out to be correct.  With a 
seven to two majority, the Court ruled that the State of Missouri could not 
restrict Trinity Lutheran from a publicly funded program solely on the 
basis of their religious affiliation.144  The Supreme Court pointed out that 
the Missouri program seemed to give Trinity Lutheran Church a choice: 
Trinity Lutheran “may participate in an otherwise available benefit 
program or remain a religious institution.”145  The Court felt like this 
crossed a line.  Because Missouri forced the Church to choose between 
disavowing its religious affiliation and receiving a public funding or 
staying true to its convictions but receiving nothing, the statute was a clear 
violation of the Free Exercise Clause.146  The majority drew its rationale 
from the Locke decision, but distinguished their decision from Locke by 
explaining that the scholarship program in Locke “did not ‘require students 
to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a government 
benefit.’”147  Due to its groundbreaking nature, the majority attempted to 
head off the use of this case as precedent in other religious freedom cases 
by inserting a footnote which limited the decision to factually similar 
situations.148  Concluding the majority opinion, Chief Justice Roberts 
expressed the view of the majority with a quote: 
If, on account of my religious faith, I am subjected to disqualifications, 
from which others are free, . . . I cannot but consider myself a persecuted 
man. . . . An odious exclusion from any of the benefits common to the 
rest of my fellow-citizens, is a persecution, differing only in degree, but 
of a nature equally unjustifiable with that, whose instruments are chains 
and torture.149 
                                                        
 143.   Emma Green, The Supreme Court Considers Whether Churches Should Get Taxpayer 
Dollars, ATLANTIC (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/trinity-
lutheran/523542/. 
 144.   Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (“But the exclusion of Trinity Lutheran from a public 
benefit for which it is otherwise qualified, solely because it is a church, is odious to our Constitution 
all the same, and cannot stand.”). 
 145.   Id. at 2021–22. 
 146.   Id. at 2024. 
 147.   Id. at 2023 (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720–21 (2004)). 
 148.   Id. at 2024 n.3 (“This case involves express discrimination based on religious identity with 
respect to playground resurfacing.  We do not address religious uses of funding or other forms of 
discrimination.”). 
 149.   Id. at 2024 (quoting H. M. Brackenridge, Speech Delivered in the House of Delegates of 
Maryland (Dec. 1818), in H. BRACKENRIDGE, W.G.D. WORTHINGTON, & JOHN S. TYSON, SPEECHES 
ON THE JEW BILL IN THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF MARYLAND 64 (1829)). 
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Though agreeing with the majority’s result, Justice Gorsuch found this 
argument unpersuasive.  Justice Gorsuch indicated that the general 
principles discussed in Trinity Lutheran were applicable in a wider area of 
law.  “[T]he general principles here do not permit discrimination against 
religious exercise—whether on the playground or anywhere else.”150 
Justice Gorsuch also pointed out flaws in the majority’s reasoning.  He 
criticized the distinction between religious status and religious use, 
outlined in their discussion of Locke and relied on to make their 
decision.151  As mentioned above, the Court in Locke found Washington’s 
discrimination constitutional because it only discriminated against the 
religious use (Davey’s pursuit of a theology degree) and not religious 
status (Davey’s Christianity).  Discrimination based on religious status 
violated the Free Exercise Clause, but states could discriminate under 
certain situations.152  Justice Gorsuch pointed to how difficult it is to apply 
this standard, stating: 
The distinction blurs in much the same way the line between acts and 
omissions can blur when stared at too long, leaving us to ask (for 
example) whether the man who drowns by awaiting the incoming tide 
does so by act (coming upon the sea) or omission (allowing the sea to 
come upon him).153 
The Court’s failure to distinguish between religion status and religious use 
could have key ramifications in the application of the state Blaine 
Amendments.  Many state courts had used this distinction to uphold their 
state no-funding provision’s applicability.  If the majority’s distinction in 
Trinity Lutheran is incorrect, as Justice Gorsuch points out, the application 
of these no-funding provisions in broader religious freedom issues could 
be unconstitutional.154  Further, the failure of the religious status/religious 
use distinction leaves the religious freedom realm without an adequate test.  
As I will explain later in this Comment, courts can address this caveat by 
using an indirect/direct public funding distinction instead of the Trinity 
Lutheran majority’s religious use/religious status distinction. 
Not failing to pull any punches, in her dissent, Justice Sotomayor 
worries that this distinction between direct and indirect funding creates 
more than just a landmark case for religious freedom.155  She contends that 
                                                        
 150.   Id. at 2026 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 151.   Id. 
 152.   See id. at 2022–23 (majority opinion). 
 153.   Id. at 2025–26 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
 154.   See infra Section III.A.3 for case law examples from Colorado and New Mexico. 
 155.   Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2027 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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the Trinity Lutheran majority obliterated past precedent and upended the 
purpose of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.156  Her core 
critique of the majority’s opinion is that the Court did not factor in the 
purpose of Trinity Lutheran’s playground.157  She points to the fact that on 
Trinity Lutheran’s website, the church states that the purpose of the school 
and playground were inherently religious.158  However, she acknowledges 
that the Court’s prior cases show that some “government funding of 
religious institutions to be consistent with the Establishment Clause.  But 
the funding in those cases came with assurances that public funds would 
not be used for religious activity, despite the religious nature of the 
institution.”159  Justice Sotomayor ends her dissent voicing concern that 
the Court’s ruling in Trinity Lutheran will destroy the various Blaine 
Amendments in the states.160 
III. ANALYSIS 
Trinity Lutheran may have added a spark in an already wildfire-prone 
area of law.  This Comment will focus on several topics most impacted by 
the Court’s decision.  First, the impact to Kansas’s and other states’ Blaine 
Amendments; second, the impact on the doctrine of separation of church 
and state; and third, the policy impacts on the school-choice movement. 
A. Implications for State-No Funding Provisions 
The worries Justice Sotomayor expressed in her dissent may end up 
justified.  After the Zelman v. Simmons-Harris decision, the strict state 
Blaine Amendments were one of the most effective methods for state 
courts to keep public money away from religious private schools.161  
Religious freedom advocates recently started to target these no-funding 
                                                        
 156.   Id. at 2029. 
 157.   Id. 
 158.   Id. at 2027. 
 159.   Id. at 2029. 
 160.   Id. at 2041 (“The constitutional provisions of thirty-nine States—all but invalidated today—
the weighty interests they protect, and the history they draw on deserve more than this judicial brush 
aside.”). 
 161.   DeForrest, supra note 4, at 602 (“State courts in the twentieth century, with a few exceptions 
already discussed, rigorously enforced Blaine language to preclude direct, and in many cases indirect, 
aid and assistance to religious schools or those who wish to attend such schools.”); but see Goldenziel, 
supra note 9, at 99 (“Given the array of judicial options for circumventing, invalidating, or even 
ignoring state no-funding provisions, the federal Blaine Amendment simply cannot be blamed for 
halting school choice in the states.  The name of Blaine seems mainly used in vain.”). 
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provisions and Trinity Lutheran moved them further in the crosshairs.162  
The Establishment Clause’s inability to prevent the flow of indirect aid to 
religious institutions has left only the Blaine Amendments in the way of 
state indirect aid to these institutions.  While there is not currently a 
challenge to Kansas’s Blaine Amendment, litigation is almost certain, and 
under the Trinity Lutheran and Zelman holdings, its Blaine Amendment is 
likely unconstitutional in specific applications. 
1. Impact on Article 6, Section 6(c) of the Kansas Constitution 
As previously mentioned, Kansas’s Blaine Amendment is unique in 
its relative brevity and limited focus on educational funding.163  Therefore, 
analysis of its applicability is only necessary for a singular realm—
educational funding.  Kansas’s scarce judicial precedent addressing this 
constitutional provision would likely cause courts to treat this issue as a 
case of first-impression making any prediction on how the Kansas 
Supreme Court would rule pure conjecture.  With no current litigation 
involving this provision, there is no way to know whether the Kansas 
Supreme Court would interpret the Kansas no-funding provision flexibly 
like Ohio, or more strictly like Colorado and Missouri.164  However, 
various Kansas Attorneys General opinion regarding whether a school 
voucher system which includes religious schools would violate the 
constitutional provision provides some insight, however, those opinions 
only look at indirect funding options.165 
As with all religious freedom cases, a balance must be maintained 
between the Free Exercise and Establishment interests.  This test is 
typically referred to as finding “room for play in the joints.”166  Trinity 
Lutheran established that a state cannot withhold a public benefit from a 
                                                        
 162.   See e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004); Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006).  
 163.   See supra Section II.A.4. 
 164.   Ohio’s Supreme Court held that the state’s no-funding provision did not block indirect aid 
in Protestants & Other Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. Essex, 275 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio 
1971), whereas Colorado’s Supreme Court found that indirect aid violated Colorado’s no-funding 
provisions in Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d 461 (Colo. 2015), vacated, 
137 S. Ct. 2325 (2017) (remanded for further consideration).  
 165.   See Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 94-37 (1994), http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/1994/ 
1994-037.htm (advising that Kansas’s no-funding provision prevents religious schools from receiving 
indirect aid from the 1994 proposed Kansas voucher program); Kan. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2000-32 
(2000), http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/2000/2000-032.htm (advising that Kansas’s no-
funding provision prevents indirect funding of religious schools such as voucher programs); Kan. 
Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2004-5 (2004), http://ksag.washburnlaw.edu/opinions/2004/2004-005.htm 
(advising that indirect funding of religious schools would not violate Kansas’s no-funding provision). 
 166.   Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2036 (2017). 
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private institution on the basis of religious affiliation.167  Withholding 
publicly available money from religious schools impacts their Free 
Exercise rights because it restricts public education funding on the basis 
of their religious affiliation.  The Trinity Lutheran majority attempted to 
parry this argument by distinguishing between religious status and 
religious use.168  As seen in Locke, states can restrict public funds from 
private individuals when used to support religious use.169  The refusal to 
fund religious schools may constitute religious discrimination under the 
Free Exercise Clause. However, because religious schools teach religious 
materials, this type of direct funding of religious use is prohibited under 
Locke and Trinity Lutheran. 
Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion in Trinity Lutheran seems to 
refute this argument.  Justice Gorsuch pointed out that religious status and 
religious use are difficult to separate.170  Any discrimination on the basis 
of religious status could be viewed as discrimination on religious use, 
rendering the test ineffective.  Thus, this test would be useless in any 
religious freedom analysis.  Justice Gorsuch distinguishes Locke and 
Trinity Lutheran because the Court based its Locke decision on the long 
tradition of preventing public funding of training for clergy and this 
tradition had no effect on the Trinity Lutheran case.171  Courts can use the 
same principle in the school financing discussion.  If a party can prove that 
there has been a tradition of the government funding religious schools in 
America, any future case over public funding of religious schools can be 
distinguished from Locke, just as Trinity Lutheran was distinguishable.  In 
contrast, if a party shows that there is a history of not funding religious 
schools then the case may look more like Locke than Trinity Lutheran. 
2. Hypothetical Kansas Case Involving the No-Funding Provision 
Kansas’s current funding scheme is likely still constitutional, but if 
Kansas follows the examples of other states and sets up a school choice 
program, Kansas’s constitutional provision may conflict with the Free 
Exercise Clause.  A hypothetical state voucher program that reimburses 
                                                        
 167.   Id. at 2024. 
 168.   Id. at 2025. 
 169.   Id. at 2023 (discussing Locke, the Trinity Lutheran Court noted that “Davey was not denied 
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parents for sending their children to private schools, but to comply with 
the Kansas Constitution, only reimburses parents who send their children 
to secular private schools would inevitably lead to a lawsuit challenging 
the voucher program on the grounds of the Free Exercise Clause.  There, 
the Kansas Supreme Court would have to apply Trinity Lutheran. 
Under the Trinity Lutheran majority’s analysis, Kansas’ Blaine 
Amendment would be unconstitutional.  Any analysis of Kansas’s 
program would require Kansas to display a state interest of the “highest 
order” in order to justify their policy.172  The hypothetical program would 
create a public benefit that religious schools cannot reap due to their 
religious nature.  In order to qualify for public funds, they would need to 
acquiesce their religious nature.  Whether you accept the majority’s 
status/use distinction or Justice Gorsuch’s argument that status and use 
both fall under the Free Exercise Clause, forcing religious schools to 
become “secular” in order to receive public funding seemingly violates 
Trinity Lutheran’s holding.  Further, because the Free Exercise Clause 
intends to protect against unequal treatment, blatantly excluding religious 
schools solely due to their religious nature clearly violate the First 
Amendment.  However, this does not mean that public money must go 
toward supporting the religious part of religious education.  Additionally, 
it is unclear how far the Court would be willing to apply Trinity Lutheran 
in cases involving the direct funding of religious schools.  While the 
analysis of Kansas’s Blaine Amendment under the Trinity Lutheran 
holding would most likely find the Blaine Amendment unconstitutional, 
any public funding of religious schools would still have Establishment 
Clause concerns. 
When addressing Establishment Clause concerns the Court has noted 
that “achieving greater separation of church and state than is already 
ensured under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution—is 
limited by the Free Exercise Clause.”173  Typically the Court applies the 
infamous Lemon test to gauge Establishment Clause concerns.174  The 
Lemon test is a three prong test which looks to see whether the statute has 
a secular purpose, whether the primary purpose of the statute advances or 
inhibits religions, and whether the statute creates excessive entanglement 
                                                        
 172.   Id. at 2019 (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978)). 
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between the state and religion.175  For a statute or policy to pass the test, it 
must satisfy all three prongs.176  Fortunately, Zelman provides clear 
precedent regarding whether indirect funding passes the Lemon Test.177  In 
Zelman, the Supreme Court held that public money could go toward 
religious institutions without violating the Establishment Clause, as long 
as that money would not “have the effect of advancing religion.”178  In 
addition, the Court applies a less stringent test for indirect public aid which 
considers two factors: 
[F]irst, whether the program administers aid in a neutral fashion, without 
differentiation based on the religious status of beneficiaries or providers 
of services; second, and more importantly, whether beneficiaries of 
indirect aid have a genuine choice among religious and nonreligious 
organizations when determining the organization to which they will 
direct that aid.179 
In other words, the money must have a secular purpose. 
If Kansas’s Blaine Amendment is found unconstitutional, the state can 
and must remedy this by clarifying and strengthening the secular/sacred 
divide.  Under current Supreme Court precedent, public education funding 
can go to religious schools but not towards supporting their religious 
purpose.180  This distinction is normally accomplished by the Supreme 
Court’s direct/indirect aid test.181  Direct aid violates the Establishment 
Clause, while indirect aid is constitutional.182  This distinction is 
necessary, yet its current application diminishes religious free exercise.  
Allowing public funds to reach into religious schools and help fund the 
secular aspect of their education helps rectify this diminishing aspect of 
the secular/sacred divide.  This is a distinction that the Court has headed 
toward and will likely adopt when a school voucher/tax credit case comes 
before the Court.  So, while Kansas’s direct support of religious schools is 
still unconstitutional due to the Establishment Clause and Kansas’s no-
funding provision, indirect aid could be constitutional under recent 
Supreme Court precedent. 
                                                        
 175.   See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 668 (2002). 
 176.   Id. 
 177.   Id. at 668–69. 
 178.   Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 683 (1971). 
 179.   Zelman, 536 U.S. at 669. 
 180.   Id. at 652 (“[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and 
provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious 
schools wholly as a result of their own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not 
readily subject to challenge under the Establishment Clause.”).  
 181.   Id. at 649. 
 182.   Id. 
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Essentially, there are two ways to understand Kansas’s no-funding 
provision.  First, Kansas courts could interpret the provision to not apply 
to indirect aid, which would seem to unconstitutionally infringe on 
religious school’s Free Exercise rights under Trinity Lutheran and Zelman.  
Second, Kansas courts could interpret the no-funding provision as only 
applicable to direct funding cases.  This interpretation would be 
constitutionally sound unless the direct funding applied to a publicly 
available program as in Trinity Lutheran.  Because both interpretations 
lead to the same conclusion, Kansas courts should take the steps necessary 
to distinguish between cases involving direct funding and cases involving 
indirect funding.  Doing so would clear up potential confusion regarding 
the provision’s application and give courts clear guidance for when a 
statute violates Kansas’s no-funding provision. 
3. What Does the Future Hold? An Analysis of Upcoming No-Funding 
Provision Cases 
Due to Kansas’s lack of current litigation on this issue, a recent 
Colorado case may help provide some insight on interactions between 
Trinity Lutheran and state no-funding provisions.  In Taxpayers for Public 
Education v. Douglas County School District, the Colorado Supreme 
Court found that a program awarding scholarships to help students pay 
their tuition violated Article IX, Section 7 of the Colorado Constitution—
Colorado’s Blaine Amendment.  The court rested its decision purely upon 
the language in Section 7.183 
The court’s reasoning bore a striking resemblance to the defense of 
Missouri’s actions in Trinity Lutheran.  The school district argued that the 
court should follow the Supreme Court’s precedent in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris due to the similarities between Ohio’s program and Colorado’s.184  
However, the court found the argument unpersuasive because Colorado’s 
laws were “far more restrictive than the Establishment Clause regarding 
governmental aid to religion.”185  The school district appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court, where the Court granted certiorari, vacated 
the judgment, and remanded the case to the Colorado Supreme Court to 
evaluate its previous decision in light of Trinity Lutheran.186  This would 
                                                        
 183.   Taxpayers for Pub. Educ. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 351 P.3d. 461, 470 (Colo. 2015). 
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have been an interesting test case for future school-choice litigation, 
unfortunately, a new school board rescinded the program at issue, and the 
Colorado Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot.187  In its past 
decision, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that this was a public 
program that gave public money indirectly to both religious and secular 
private schools.188  The Colorado Supreme Court’s past holding allowing 
the state to discriminate against religious schools solely due to their 
religious nature may be in danger after Trinity Lutheran.  Restricting these 
types of programs will be nearly impossible post-Trinity Lutheran, 
potentially opening the flood-gates to litigation involving similarly 
structured programs. 
If the remand had led to a decision, the remand would have likely 
ended in favor of the school choice program because the Colorado 
Supreme Court based its original decision on Colorado’s no-funding 
provision.  Limiting the program to only secular schools would violate 
Trinity Lutheran’s precedent and Zelman’s finding of indirect aid to 
religious schools as constitutional under the Establishment Clause. 
In addition to the Colorado case, other states also face Trinity Lutheran 
upending prior decisions.  When the Supreme Court remanded Taxpayers 
for Public Education, it also remanded a New Mexico case, Weinbaum v. 
Skandera.189  The case revolved around the state’s Instructional Material 
Law.190  The law allowed the state to give certain public and private 
schools money to buy textbooks approved by New Mexico.191  This 
included support for religious private schools.192  The petitioners 
challenged this support because New Mexico’s Constitution prevents 
public funding for any religious educational institution.193  Both the state 
district court and the court of appeals found in the favor of the state.194  
The New Mexico Supreme Court, however, reversed and held that the 
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state’s program violated the state Constitution.195  “The broad language of 
this provision and the history of its adoption and the efforts to amend it 
evince a clear intent to restrict both direct and indirect support to sectarian, 
denominational, or private schools, colleges, or universities.”196  Similar 
to the Colorado case, the New Mexico Supreme Court found that its 
Constitution is more restrictive than the United States Constitution 
regarding the public funding of religious purposes. 
In reexamining the issue after the Supreme Court’s remand, the New 
Mexico Supreme Court will likely find the program constitutional.  
Because the New Mexico program aimed to improve all schools, whether 
private or public, any exclusion of religious schools by virtue of their 
religious status would violate of the Free Exercise Clause.  Limiting the 
public program to only secular schools falls into the same trap Missouri 
fell into.197  A state must have a compelling interest to withhold a generally 
available public benefit from religious institutions.198  Unless New Mexico 
can provide a compelling reason for preventing the state from helping 
religious schools buy educational material, then New Mexico would likely 
be violating the Free Exercise Clause. 
Both the Colorado case and the New Mexico case demonstrate the 
impact of the Trinity Lutheran decision.  Now, governmental programs 
offering a public good, but restricting the public good from religious 
institutions, will face Free Exercise scrutiny.  While it is still possible to 
uphold this discrimination, such provisions must now pass strict scrutiny. 
These two cases demonstrate the potential difficulty in applying the 
Trinity Lutheran holding.  There’s no perfect test from Trinity Lutheran to 
apply to these subsequent cases.  If courts use the totality of prior 
precedent—such as a test combining the indirect/direct distinction with a 
public program distinction—lower courts can apply the Trinity Lutheran 
distinction more easily.  As further explained below, these distinctions are 
key to developing a clear test for similar religious liberty cases. 
While Trinity Lutheran helped empower the Free Exercise argument 
against the Blaine Amendments, some have questioned whether these no-
funding provisions violate the right to Free Speech.199  While these Free 
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Speech arguments have not always been persuasive to the courts, they are 
still worthy of consideration.  For example, Trinity Lutheran appealed the 
district court’s ruling, except on their Free Speech claim. 200  Some argue 
that the lack of support for religious organizations alongside support for 
secular organizations amounts to viewpoint discrimination.201  The 
Supreme Court has held that the denial of generally available funds from 
private parties on the basis of their religion constitutes viewpoint 
discrimination and violates the First Amendment.202  While there is some 
precedent applying this view to no-funding provisions, courts tend to find 
that the states’ attempts to avoid Establishment Clause issues is enough of 
a compelling reason for the Free Speech violations.203  As such, Free 
Exercise complaints are generally more effective in combatting the various 
no-funding provisions.  Free Speech was not raised on appeal in Trinity 
Lutheran and the resulting success in that case for religious freedom 
advocates supports attacking no-funding provisions from a Free Exercise 
perspective instead of a Free Speech perspective. 
B. Implications for the Doctrine of Separation of Church and State 
No-funding provisions have seemingly become the doctrine of 
separation of church and state.  As discussed in Section I.A.2 regarding 
the motivations behind the Blaine Amendments, this was not the original 
formulation.  Looking at the key figures behind the support for these no-
funding provisions shows that the purpose was to retain a support of 
“generic Protestantism” in the public sphere.204  As this purpose slipped 
away, the no-funding provisions’ association with the separation of church 
and state emerged.  This has clouded the proper relationship the state 
should have with religion.  Further, the current understanding of the 
separation of church and state may lead to unfair discrimination against 
religious organizations such as in Trinity Lutheran.  Trinity Lutheran 
seemingly helps address this issue, however, learning to navigate religious 
                                                        
4, at 617–26. 
 200.   Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779, 782 (8th Cir. 2015), 
rev’d sub nom, Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. 2012. 
 201.   DeForrest, supra note 4, at 621. 
 202.   Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Vir., 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995). 
 203.   DeForrest, supra note 4, at 622 (“[I]t is critical to note that the Supreme Court has recognized 
that Establishment Clause violations constitute a compelling state justification for content-based 
restrictions against religious speech.”). 
 204.   Id. at 602 (“[T]here was an almost imperative desire on the part of the proponents of the 
Blaine Amendment to protect generic Protestant religiosity in the common schools and the public 
square.”). 
 
2018 BLAINES BEWARE 781 
freedom cases post-Trinity Lutheran will be the next hurdle for courts.  
Prior Supreme Court cases may provide an answer to this problem. 
Currently, Supreme Court cases rely on several key distinctions in 
religious freedom situations.  First is the indirect/direct aid distinction.  
Direct federal aid of religion is almost always found to be 
unconstitutional.205  Indirect aid is given more leeway.206  Yet even then, 
courts can find indirect aid unconstitutional, such as in Locke.207  The 
reason for this leads to the second key distinction the Supreme Court uses 
in religious freedom cases, the religious use/religious status distinction. 
The Trinity Lutheran majority used the religious use/religious status 
distinction to find Missouri’s actions violated the Free Exercise Clause.208  
Justice Gorsuch may end up vindicated in his criticism of this distinction 
that this distinction is not helpful.  The overlap between the two concepts 
is too broad for effective use in religious freedom cases.  While a test based 
on religious use/religious status is a simpler test to apply, it is an overbroad 
distinction that courts will struggle to apply to case-specific facts. 
Trinity Lutheran appears to add another distinction: whether the 
funding is part of a publicly available program.209  If a state ties funding to 
one of these programs, the funding of religious institutions (whether direct 
or indirect funding) appears to be more constitutional. 
Expanding the direct/indirect aid distinction to include the public 
program distinction from Trinity Lutheran would create a better test.  This 
test would harmonize the Court’s decisions in Zelman and Trinity 
Lutheran while leaving the no-funding provisions with some teeth.  This 
test can combine Zelman’s holding that indirect funding is constitutional 
due to private choice and Trinity Lutheran’s holding that a state cannot 
prevent religious groups from participating in publicly available programs.  
This test would allow direct funding of religious institutions if that funding 
comes from a program open to the public i.e. Trinity Lutheran.  Further, 
courts would likely allow indirect funding as long as it was through the 
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action of private individuals.  Finally, this test would leave the courts the 
ability to use the Blaine Amendments to block religious funding that falls 
outside of these two distinctions. 
However, this test would conflict with some prior precedent.  For 
instance, the current understanding of Locke would be bad law, but Justice 
Gorsuch’s Trinity Lutheran concurrence provides a way to remove the 
religious use/status distinction while retaining Locke.210  There are many 
ways to distinguish Locke that preserve the direct/indirect funding 
distinction.  For instance, while a court could deem the Washington 
Constitution’s ban on indirect funding of religious institution 
unconstitutional, the court could still prevent funding of religious clergy, 
thereby distinguishing Locke. 
Whatever way the courts decide to go, a test merging Zelman and 
Trinity Lutheran is the proper test to adopt, expand, and use in religious 
freedom cases.  This test is easier for the lower courts to apply and would 
likely lead to less religious freedoms cases brought before the Supreme 
Court.  Further, a test based upon these distinctions attacks the heart of the 
issue regarding no-funding provisions—whether public money can go 
towards religious institutions and to what degree this is constitutional.  The 
religious status/religious use distinction is difficult to apply because 
religious status can look a lot like religious use and vice versa.  Looking 
to only two elements, direct/indirect funding and public programs, grants 
clarity to an often cloudy and confusing realm of law.  Its adoption would 
help clear up this area of law by giving the courts a practical test to apply. 
However, as with all good tests, there must be some nuance in its 
application.  Courts should still factor in other elements like the degree of 
private choice and the neutrality of the program.  A factor test would 
improve the test’s flexibility, allowing it to be applicable and used in a 
variety of situations. 
C. Implications for the “School Choice” Movement 
The questionable constitutionality of the Blaine Amendments has long 
been a center-piece of the school choice movement.  However, this 
movement’s victory may not be as sweet as once hoped.  Public funding 
of religious schools has some concerning aspects that may worry religious 
leaders.  For one, governments tend to tie public money to governmental 
oversight.211  Allowing public money to flow directly into religious 
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schools would require government standards to apply in the classrooms.212  
Federal or state educational standards could bring mandates to teach topics 
such as evolution, which most fundamentalist Christians reject.213  In all 
likelihood, this would lead to some of the more “fervent” religious schools 
opting out of receiving any public funding. 
The elephant in the room is school vouchers.214  School vouchers 
provide a way for public money to flow into religious schools without 
governmental standards becoming protrusive.215  In essence, the state 
attaches funds to a child and those funds flow to whatever school they 
chose, religious or public.  This is why school vouchers are at the focal 
point of this fight.  The Trinity Lutheran decision seemingly adds fuel to 
the fire regarding this topic.  Supporters of school vouchers now have an 
argument in that if secular private schools receive school vouchers, 
restricting private schools from these programs would seemingly violate 
Trinity Lutheran.  Foreseeing this issue, the Court tried to limit its holding 
to the facts of the case.216  Furthermore, the Court sent back a Colorado 
case involving school vouchers in order to have the Colorado court apply 
Trinity Lutheran to a school vouchers case.217  As previously mentioned, 
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the Colorado case will quickly demonstrate how some courts will apply 
Trinity Lutheran to school vouchers. 
Education savings accounts (ESAs) present a similar problem as 
vouchers.218 ESAs are already in use in five states but are mostly limited 
to students with special needs.219  Recently, Nevada created an expansive 
ESA program that went beyond the bounds of other states.220  The policy 
was challenged and went before the Nevada Supreme Court where the 
court upheld the ESAs but found the funding mechanism 
unconstitutional.221  While both school vouchers and ESAs offer more 
“mainstream” ways to give public support to religious schools, religious 
charter schools offer another alternative.222  ESAs offer the same 
“indirect” support that school vouchers would achieve.  Further, this 
indirect funding gives parents more freedom to choose how to fund their 
children’s education.  They can use the money for a private elementary or 
high school or save the money to pay for a college education. 
Whether the states move toward school vouchers or ESAs, courts will 
run into hurdles when reviewing these school funding methods for 
constitutionality.  As official government programs, they will have to pass 
the Lemon test.  Yet, now the courts will also have to balance that with the 
precedent established in Trinity Lutheran.  Courts must judge the 
constitutionality of a government program entangling government and 
religion, while considering that denying religious institutions access to the 
program violates the Free Exercise Clause.  This conflict will inevitably 
bring a challenge before the Supreme Court, offering the Court an 
opportunity to clarify the topic of public funding for religious institutions.  
The Court should take that opportunity to endorse the use of a test which 
the lower courts can use to address religious freedom issues and conflicts 
with state no-funding provisions.  Formulating a test centered on the 
indirect/direct funding distinction offers a flexible test for courts to solve 
complex religious freedom cases and to create a clearer line between 
church and state. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Though the majority of Americans support the separation of church 
and state, they are unaware of the discriminatory basis of its current 
application.  The Blaine Amendments are still tainted by the prejudice of 
their initial supporters, and while Kansas’s version may or may not share 
the same prejudicial view as its proposed federal counterpart, it, and other 
state no-funding provisions, has helped stifle the debate about the proper 
role of public funding for religious schooling.  Trinity Lutheran may serve 
as a landmark case in the field of religious freedom as it limited the 
applicability of these no-funding provisions.  With the Supreme Court’s 
established precedent, there may finally be enough case law to overturn 
the various no-funding provisions, including Kansas’s.  Further, prior 
precedent gives the tools to craft a test to address these types of cases in 
the future.  Kansas does not have any applicable reason to continue abiding 
by its own no-funding provision in indirect aid situations.  It may be years 
until Kansas reaches this conclusion, yet the pieces are in place for Article 
6, Section 6 of the Kansas Constitution to be declared unconstitutional 
when applied to situations involving indirect educational aid to religious 
organizations. 
